Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design ISSN: 2399-844X(Print), 2399-8458(Online) DOI:10.22574/jmid.2016.12.002 SCHOOL CHOICE UNDER COMPLETE INFORMATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY Yan Chen University of Michigan, USA, and Tsinghua University, China yanchen@umich.edu Yingzhi Liang University of Michigan, USA yingzhi@umich.edu Tayfun So¨nmez Boston College, USA sonmezt@bc.edu ABSTRACT We present an experimental study of three school choice mechanisms under complete information, using the designed environment in Chen& So¨nmez (2006). We find that the top trading cycles(TTC) mechanism outperforms both the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance(DA) and the Boston immediate acceptance(BOS) mechanism in terms of truth-telling and efficiency, whereas DA is more stable than either TTC or BOS. Compared to the incomplete information setting in Chen& So¨nmez(2006), the performance of both TTC and BOS improves with more information, whereas that of DA does not. Keywords : School choice, experiment, mechanism design. JEL Classification Numbers : C78, C92, D82. We thank Alexandra(Sasha) Killewald and Kan Takeuchi for excellent research assistance. Financial support from the National Science Foundation through grant no. SES-0962492 to Chen is gratefully acknowledged. This research was approved by the University of Michigan IRB. Copyright c Yan Chen, Yingzhi Liang, Tayfun So¨nmez /(), 2016, 45–82. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License.0, http://creativecommons.org.